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Executive Summary
● Misclassification occurs when an employer, at hiring, 
improperly classifies a worker as an independent 
contractor rather than an employee. 
● Responsible employers may misclassify workers 
because they are unclear or confused about how to 
apply complex, inconsistent and varying standards. 
● Other employers intentionally misclassify workers, 
assuming the risk of incurring penalties, as a strategy 
to significantly cut labor costs, limit their liability and 
gain an unfair competitive advantage. 
● The results of this study are based on audits performed 
by the NYS Department of Labor Unemployment 
Insurance Division during the four-year period 2002-05. 
Audits were performed on firms in certain industries, 
and data was extrapolated statewide for these industries 
only, based on given employment information.
● Based on general and specific audits, an estimated 
39,587 New York employers within the audited 
industries misclassified workers as independent 
contractors each year. 
● Of these, approximately 5,880 per year, or 14.9%, were 
construction industry employers.
● Approximately 704,785 workers — or 10.3% of the 
state’s private sector workforce in these audited 
industries — are misclassified each year.
● Approximately 45,474 construction workers or 14.8% 
of the construction workforce in New York State are 
misclassified in a given year.
● Misclassification’s impact can be severe (1) for workers, 
(2) for employers in those industries where the practice 
is prevalent, and (3) for government and taxpayers. 
 Workers
o Misclassification denies many workers protections 
and benefits that they are entitled to. 
o Worker misclassification disrupts labor markets by 
enabling unscrupulous employers to ignore labor 
standards. 
 Employers
o Misclassification destabilizes the business climate, 
creating an un-level playing field and causing law-
abiding businesses to suffer unfair competition.
o Responsible employers who properly classify 
their workers as employees have higher costs and 
are underbid by competitors who intentionally 
misclassify their workers.
• The construction industry is prone to 
classification abuse by unscrupulous 
contractors. 
 Government and taxpayers
o For the industries covered in the audits, average 
unemployment insurance taxable wages 
underreported due to misclassification each 
year during the four-year period 2002-2005 is 
$4,283,663,772. 
o Unemployment insurance tax underreported for 
the same period in these industries is $175,674,161.
o Misclassification costs government — at all levels 
— substantial, uncollected revenues, resources 
that are needed for vital government programs and 
services and for the maintenance of a productive 
workforce and economy.
● Among items for policymakers’ consideration are the 
following: 
 Conduct high profile enforcement in those industries, 
such as construction, where misclassification is 
widespread 
 Clarify guidelines so that state agency determinations 
are uniform and consistently applied
 Presume employee status
 Extend employee protections to independent contractors
 Provide more resources for enforcement
 Promote more information-sharing among agencies
 Extend current outreach and education efforts
Any reform measures would, of course, require further 
study to determine their impact on public policy and 
agency practices.
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I. What Is Worker Misclassification?
Misclassification occurs when an employer, at hiring, improperly classifies a worker as an independent 
contractor rather than an employee. 
The distinction between “employee” and “independent contractor” relates to the right of control. 
Employers have the right to direct the means, methods and outcome of their employees’ work. 
Independent contractors, properly classified, are not employees but are in business for themselves.1  
They are hired to accomplish a task or tasks determined by the employer but retain the right to control 
how they will accomplish it. 
Responsible employers may misclassify workers because they are unclear or confused about how 
to apply complex, inconsistent and varying standards.2 Well-intentioned employers may have difficulty 
determining whether a worker is an employee or can properly be classified as an independent contractor.3 
Other employers intentionally misclassify workers, assuming the risk of incurring penalties, as a 
strategy to significantly cut labor costs, limit their liability and gain an unfair competitive advantage.  
1  For a thorough discussion of federal IRS standards, see IRS Publication 15-A, Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, hereinafter IRS 15-A, 
available online at www.irs.gov. For NYS DOL standards, see Covered and Excluded Employment under the UI Law at www.labor.state.ny.us/ui.
2  The Governor’s Task Force on Independent Contractors: A Report to Governor George E. Pataki, 1999. [hereinafter Task Force Report] 
Recognizing the need for “a State system in which determinations…are made simply, consistently, and fairly,” the Governor’s Task Force on 
Independent Contractors was convened, pursuant to Executive Order 78.1, to hear extensive testimony from business and labor. The Task 
Force issued a report in 1999 providing clarifying guidelines for proper classification and with specific recommendations to achieve uniform 
determinations. Their recommendations have not been implemented. 
3  For a review of various tests applied by courts and federal and state agencies, see Employment Arrangements: Improved Outreach Could Help 
Ensure Proper Worker Classification, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Senate, United 
States Government Accounting Office, July 2006, hereinafter GAO 2006, at 51-55; also see Task Force Report at 8-11. 
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This study uses data based on audits performed by the NYS Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance 
Division during the four-year period 2002-2005. Audits were performed on firms in certain industries,4 and 
data was extrapolated statewide for these industries only, based on given employment information. Using 
general and specific audits conducted during the four year period 2002-2005, it is estimated that 39,587 New 
York employers (of about 400,732) in audited industries misclassified workers each year as independent 
contractors. Of these, approximately 5,880 employers, or 14.9%, were in the construction industry.5 
II. What Is the Extent of Worker Misclassification in New York State?
Table 2:  
Construction Industry
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 4,740
 2003 5,230
 2004 6,057
 2005 7,493
 Average 5,880
Table 3: Construction Employers as a 
Percent of Audited Misclassifying Firms
  Construction  
 Year Share
 2002 13.8%
 2003 13.9%
 2004 14.0%
 2005 17.3%
 Average 14.9%
Table 1:  
Audited Industries
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 34,253
 2003 37,608
 2004 43,282
 2005 43,206
 Average 39,587
NYS Employers with Workers Misclassified as Independent Contractors
4  For a list of the industries audited, see infra, V.: Methodology (footnote 40).
5 The New York State DOL runs two types of audits on employers: general and specific. General audits are conducted on employers who are 
not suspected violators of state laws but may reflect regulators’ concerns about industries with higher rates of noncompliance. Specific audits 
are conducted on employers who, for various reasons, are suspected violators of state laws. For more information on data collection and DOL 
audits, see infra, V.: Methodology.
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Approximately 704,785 workers — or 10.3% of the state’s private sector workforce (comprising approximately 
6,858,266) — are misclassified each year in audited industries, and approximately 45,474 construction workers or 
14.8% of the construction workforce (comprising approximately 307,257) in New York State are misclassified:
Percent of Workers Misclassified as Independent Contractors
Table 6:  
Audited Industries
 Year General  Specific  All  
 Audits Audits Audits
 2002 8.9% 56.8% 10.1%
 2003 8.7% 61.0% 10.0%
 2004 9.6% 16.2% 10.4%
 2005 9.2% 19.5% 10.6%
 Average 9.1% 22.3% 10.3%
Table 7:  
Construction Industry
 Year General  Specific  All  
 Audits Audits Audits
 2002 14.2% 63.0% 15.1%
 2003 16.4% 22.0% 16.5%
 2004 12.6% 10.0% 11.7%
 2005 14.2% 12.3% 13.5%
 Average 14.8% 14.5% 14.8%
Table 4:  
Audited Industries
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 691,744
 2003 680,113
 2004 713,103
 2005 734,180
 Average 704,785
Table 5:  
Construction Industry
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 48,842
 2003 52,847
 2004 37,037
 2005 43,173
 Average 45,474
Number of Workers Misclassified as Independent Contractors
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Misclassification’s impact can be severe (1) for workers, 
(2) for employers in those industries where the practice is 
prevalent, and (3) for government and taxpayers. 
Workers
● Misclassification denies many workers protections and 
benefits they are entitled to. 
● Worker misclassification disrupts labor markets by en-
abling unscrupulous employers to ignore labor standards. 
In an employer-employee relationship, the employer 
must withhold income taxes, withhold and pay Social 
Security and Medicare taxes, pay unemployment tax on 
wages paid, provide workers’ compensation insurance, pay 
minimum wage and overtime wages, and include employees 
in employee benefit plans.6 Employers are not generally 
obligated to make these payments to, or on behalf of, 
independent contractors. 
“Employees” receive unemployment and workers’ 
compensation benefits and are typically protected by a 
broad spectrum of federal and state legislation affecting 
wages, health and safety, the right to organize, family and 
medical leave, and pension security.7 
Independent contractors are generally excluded 
from the coverage of protective legislation. Misclassified 
workers must first realize that they are misclassified, 
understand what that means, and then successfully 
challenge their misclassification through administrative 
or court action to confirm their eligibility for and receive 
these statutory protections 8 — an impractical remedy for 
many because of the time, expense, and risk involved. 
Misclassified workers — as putative independent 
contractors — are directly and immediately burdened in 
several ways. They generally do not file for unemployment 
insurance benefits even though they may be eligible 9 and 
do not receive appropriate levels of workers’ compensation 
insurance. If they are unemployed or injured on the job, 
the economic consequences can be devastating. They are 
solely responsible for withholding and reporting taxes 
at the substantially higher self-employed tax rate. Their 
employers might provide them with the required IRS Form 
1099-MISC showing gross wages paid [Schedule C  — self- 
employment] or simply pay cash “under the table” —  
without regard to tax laws, statutory wage standards and 
“below the radar screen” of state regulators. Some may 
never benefit from Social Security. They are on their own 
for any health care or retirement savings. These workers 
may also be required, as a condition of employment, to 
purchase their own workers’ compensation and liability 
insurance coverage, and to sign waivers releasing 
employers from liability and other obligations inherent in 
a typical employer-employee relationship.10 
Some workers choose independent contractor status. 
Others are compelled to accept it. Facilitated by recent 
changes in the workplace, in technology and communica-
tions, many higher-paid, high-skilled workers choose to be 
independent contractors, contracting for particular projects 
for particular employers, because independent contractor 
status carries desirable tax advantages, such as the range 
of available deductions, increased flexibility over time, and 
greater control over work.11 
III. What Is the Impact of Worker Misclassification?
6  IRS 15-A at 6; GAO 2006, at 25.
7  Misclassification can impact workers’ rights and protections pursant to these federal and state statutes: U.S. Department of Labor [Fair Labor 
Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, OSHA]; Internal Revenue Service [FICA, Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Self-Employment 
Contributions Act]; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [Medicare]; Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation [ERISA]; Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission [Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act]; National Labor Relations Board; Social Security Administration; NYS Department of Labor [unemployment insurance]; Workers Com-
pensation Board; NYS Department of Taxation and Finance. GAO 2006, at 8. 
8  GAO 2006, at 21.
9  Independent Contractors: Prevalence and Implications for Unemployment Insurance Programs, Planmatics, Inc., for the U.S. Department of La-
bor Employment and Training Administration, hereinafter Planmatics, February 2000, at 91- 92. 
10  For a useful overview, see The Social and Economic Costs of Employee Misclassification in Construction, Françoise Carré, et al, Construction 
Policy Research Center, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School, Harvard School of Public Health, hereinafter Massachusetts Study, 
December 2004, at 8-9. 
11  Planmatics, at 3.
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Other workers may not have a choice. Without the 
same levels of skill, education and training associated 
with higher-paid workers, without the benefit of collective 
bargaining and with little or no individual bargaining 
power, these workers are often compelled by employers 
to accept independent contractor status, at low pay with 
no health, pension, or retirement benefits,12 and without 
the protection of laws covering “employees” such as wage 
and hour standards. These workers cannot afford to make 
contributions into retirement accounts and generally will 
not file for and collect unemployment insurance when 
needed. Undocumented workers, whose status makes them 
even less likely to challenge the employer’s designation, 
are among the most vulnerable. 
Employers
● Misclassification destabilizes the business climate, 
creating an un-level playing field and causing law-
abiding businesses to suffer unfair competition.
● Responsible employers who properly classify their work-
ers as employees have higher costs and are underbid by 
competitors who intentionally misclassify their workers. 
● The construction industry is prone to classification 
abuse by unscrupulous contractors. 
Employers have powerful economic incentives to limit 
or cut labor costs, particularly in those industries, such as 
construction, that are sharply competitive. The immediate 
advantages of misclassifying a worker are, for many em-
ployers, worth the more remote risk of being caught and 
penalized. To the extent that there is insufficient monitor-
ing, oversight and regulation by policymakers and affected 
state and federal agencies, misclassification will continue 
to destabilize the business climate in certain industries. 
Misclassifying employers reap substantial savings 
and enjoy an unfair competitive advantage by not making 
those payments and incurring those costs required of a 
typical employer-employee relationship: the administrative 
costs for withholding taxes and making payments for 
Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, 
providing the proper level of workers’ compensation 
insurance, paying overtime and minimum wages, and 
including workers in employee benefit programs. 13 
Social Security and Medicare taxes — paid by 
employers who properly classify their workers as 
employees — amount to 7.65 percent of wages paid. 
Unemployment taxes paid to the federal government are at 
0.8% of the first $7,000 of remuneration. Combined federal 
and state unemployment insurance taxes are higher.14 
Federal and state unemployment taxes are estimated to 
be an average of 0.8 percent of wages, which could be a 
substantial cost.15 Steadily rising medical costs and workers’ 
compensation premiums represent a significant cost factor in 
certain, more injury-prone industries such as construction.
Responsible employers carry an undue burden: to 
the extent that misclassifying employers are not paying 
into insurance funds, responsible employers make up the 
difference in higher premiums.16 
Avoiding workers’ compensation payments 
is the leading reason that employers intentionally 
misclassify workers, a larger factor than non-payment 
of unemployment insurance contributions. A study 
of several states’ insurance funds conducted for the 
12 The 2000 Planmatics study for the US DOL found that the majority of independent contractors, without making a distinction between those 
properly classified and those misclassified, has no health insurance or retirement benefits and earns middle to low-level wages. Planmatics, 
at 3, 91-92.
13 GAO 2006 at 25; Planmatics at 25-27.
14 In New York State, the unemployment insurance tax rate is based on an employer’s experience with the system and its account balance.  See 
NYS Unemployment Insurance Law Article 18 §581et. seq.
15 Commerce Clearing House, Business Owner’s Toolkit at www.toolkit.cch.com.
16 Another problem for the business community concerns mistaken, but not intentional, misclassification due to inconsistent standards and the 
inconsistent or conflicting application of standards among various federal and state agencies. For example, under §530 of IRS regulations, an 
employer may appropriately classify individuals as independent contractors while the states might hold them to be employees. See http://
www.unclefed.com/Tax-News/1996/Nr96-44.html. Employees’ wages may be taxable for state purposes and would not be taxable for FICA, 
FUTA, or Federal withholding. Also see Planmatics at 3 and GAO 2006 at 25.
8 Impact  |  The Cost of Worker Misclassification In New York State | Cornell ILR School  
U.S. Department of Labor concluded that employers 
will take the risks associated with misclassification to 
gain a competitive advantage by not paying workers’ 
compensation premiums  — risks they would not likely 
take for unemployment insurance cost savings alone. 
The number one reason why employers use 
independent contractors and/or misclassify 
employees is the savings in not paying workers’ 
compensation premiums and not being subject to 
workplace injury and disability-related disputes. 
Another reason is the avoidance of costs associated 
with employee lawsuits against employers alleging 
discrimination…17
Direct and immediate cost savings are an obvious 
incentive but so are potential cost savings from limiting or 
eliminating employer liability. In an employer-employee 
relationship, employers are liable for the torts committed 
by their employees within the scope of their employment. 
Employers are not liable for the torts of independent 
contractors. According to one advisor, “the tax savings 
[from hiring independent contractors] pale in comparison 
to the elimination of tort liability.” 18 
The construction industry is particularly prone to 
worker abuse through misclassification. Studies conducted 
by the U.S. General Accounting Office and for the U.S. 
Department of Labor underscore that the construction 
industry stands out both as the industry with the highest 
percentage of independent contractors [22%] but also as the 
industry with the “highest incidence of misclassification” 
[emphasis added].19 
This finding should come as no surprise. Construction 
is an expanding but fiercely competitive contract industry, 
characterized by slim profit margins, high injury and 
comp rates, comprised largely of numerous small to 
medium-sized companies whose numbers and size may 
make them more likely to operate beyond the view of state 
regulators. It is labor intensive, its jobs are temporary, 
and many jobs, particularly in unlicensed trades, can be 
broken down into piece work. It is a lucrative employment 
source for immigrant, often undocumented, workers 
and unscrupulous employers use their workers’ alleged 
independent contractor status to circumvent employer 
obligations under federal immigration laws. And the 
construction workforce is mobile — making it difficult 
for regulators to track down particular employers. All 
the elements are present throughout the industry, but 
misclassification and “under the table” practices operate 
with particular impunity in the large and expanding 
residential and commercial sectors.20
Government and taxpayers
● Impact on New York State’s unemployment insurance 
fund
● Broader implications of worker misclassification
17  Planmatics, at iii.  States providing data: California, New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, New Jersey, Washington, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Colorado, Connecticut, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
18  A later comment in the same study: “In high risk industries, workers’ compensation was the single most dominant reason for misclassifica-
tion. Many employers believe the risk of being caught is acceptable if it means the survival of their business.” Planmatics, at 92.
19  Commerce Clearing House, Business Owner’s Toolkit, at www.toolkit.cch.com. 
20  GAO 2006, at 49; Planmatics, at 41. Other industries with disproportionately high numbers of independent contractors — and high rates of 
misclassification — include trucking, home health care, and retail services, at 91.
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The average annual underreported wages subject to unemployment insurance taxes in audited industries  
during 2002-2005 were $4,283,663,771.79 21. Here it is important to note that unemployment insurance  
taxable wages are limited to the first $8,500 earned per employee during a single calendar year. 
UI Taxable Wages Underreported for Workers  
Misclassified As Independent Contractors
Table 8: Audited Industries
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 $4,343,411,205.80
 2003 $3,783,602,972.84
 2004 $4,217,935,631.89
 2005 $4,789,705,276.84
 Average $4,283,663,771.79
Table 9: Audited Industries
 Year General Audits Specific Audits All Audits
 2002 $6,158.72 $7,004.09 $6,278.93
 2003 $5,726.70 $4,644.21 $5,563.20
 2004 $5,421.17 $8,098.07 $5,914.90
 2005 $6,345.76 $7,069.67 $6,527.33
 Average $5,913.09 $6,704.01  $6,071.09
UI Taxable Wages Underreported Per Worker 22  
The average annual underreported UI taxable  
wages per employee is just over $6,000: 
Figures for the construction industry  
are generally higher: 
Table 10: Construction Industry
 Year General Audits  Specific Audits All Audits
 2002 $6,797.21 $5,074.83 $6,658.11
 2003 $7,016.77 $11,669.80 $7,165.45
 2004 $11,065.27 $3,241.98 $8,597.14
 2005 $6,988.95 $6,557.50 $6,837.44
 Average $7,967.05 $6,636.03 $7,314.54
21  While misclassification may not be the only cause of underreported wages and tax, it has been considered acceptable to use these figures as 
economic effects of misclassification (see Planmatics 2000).
22  Article 18. NYS Unemployment Insurance Law. Sec. 518. Wages. 1. Limitation. (a) “Wages” means all remuneration paid, except that such term 
does not include remuneration paid to an employee by an employer after eight thousand five hundred dollars have been paid to such employee 
by such employer with respect to employment during any calendar year. The term “employment” includes for the purposes of this subdivision 
services constituting employment under any unemployment compensation law of another state or the United States.
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The average annual unemployment insurance tax underreported in audited industries for the same period is $175,674,161.45:
UI Tax Underreported for Workers  
Misclassified As Independent Contractors
Table 11: Audited Industries 
Table 12: Audited Industries
 Year General Audits  Specific Audits All Audits
 2002 $231.69 $317.98 $243.97
 2003 $196.62 $190.90 $195.75
 2004 $172.22 $269.73 $190.21
 2005 $261.75 $336.78 $280.57
 Average $215.57 $278.85 $227.63
Table 13: Construction Industry
 Year General Audits  Specific Audits All Audits
 2002 $262.34 $246.75 $261.08
 2003 $268.65 $479.92 $275.40
 2004 $352.69 $101.18 $273.34
 2005 $362.17 $345.32 $356.26
 Average $311.46 $293.29  $291.52
  Statewide  
 Year Approximation
 2002 $168,764,746.84
 2003 $133,132,061.03
 2004 $194,919,698.66
 2005 $205,880,139.28
 Average $175,674,161.45
The average UI tax underreported per worker per year is $227.63:
UI Tax Underreported Per Worker
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The financial viability of the state unemployment insur-
ance fund is at issue.23 An economic downturn amplifies 
problems caused by misclassification as funds are drained of 
resources. According to the U.S. Department of Labor study, 
…this drain would most likely have to be offset 
by assigning higher contribution rates to those 
employers that correctly classify their workers and 
pay their taxes, placing them at a further economic 
disadvantage.24
Broader implications of worker misclassification
The costs of worker misclassification extend well beyond 
workers and employers in those industries where it is most 
widely practiced. Misclassification costs government — at all 
levels — substantial, uncollected revenues, resources that 
are needed for vital government programs and services  and 
for the maintenance of a productive workforce and economy. 
The Internal Revenue Service last estimated misclassi-
fication’s cost to the nation in 1984. Their estimate in 2006 
dollars for tax loss in Social Security tax, unemployment 
insurance tax, and income tax is $2.72 billion.25 Given the 
substantial growth in the nation’s economy, population, 
and workforce since 1984, as well as recent shifts toward 
contingent and casual labor, it is reasonable to assume 
that the true figure today would be much higher. 
The implications for overall lost state revenues are 
severe. One recent estimate of the total tax loss due to 
misclassification in California is as high as $7 billion.26  
A 2004 study in Massachusetts estimates losses of $12.6 
to $35 million to that state’s unemployment insurance 
system, a loss of $91 million in state income tax revenue, 
and $91 million in unpaid workers’ compensation premiums.27 
Misclassification’s impact on the state’s workers’ 
compensation system is beyond the scope of this 
study but deserves further attention. Some reasonable 
estimates of the costs in lost premiums should be 
calculated. An analysis involving five other states 
showed that misclassification penalized workers’ 
compensation insurers through the “retroactive use” of 
the system — when independent contractors file claims as 
employees for injuries received on the job. 
The insurers have to pay benefits for workers they 
never received premiums for. Some workers, who 
have been independent contractors and therefore 
exempted from workers’ compensation for many 
years, become employees and get covered under 
workers’ compensation without having paid 
premiums for all of the previous years…28
Just as responsible employers bear the costs of 
unfair competition in higher insurance premiums and 
lost business opportunities, so the state’s taxpayers are 
shortchanged in resources lost to government and have to 
make up the difference. 
Significant revenue shortfalls translate into broad 
social costs — less money available for communities, 
for school districts, hospitals, law enforcement, and the 
various other vital services of state, county, and municipal 
governments. To the extent that employer-based plans do 
not provide for health care or retirement, additional costs 
are borne by government-run or sponsored programs. 
23  Planmatics, at 91
24  Ibid. at 93.
25 GAO 2006, at 1-2.
26  Jerome Horton, California State Assembly Member, 51st Assembly District, recorded interview within “1099 Misclassification: It’s Time to 
Play by the Rules,” video stream currently available at http://www.mosaicprint.com/client_preview/1099/index.html#.
27  Massachusetts Study, at 2. Estimates noted here are for all industries. 
28 Planmatics, at 75-76. 
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When workers are misclassified as independent con-
tractors, they are denied fundamental legal protections,  
responsible employers face unfair and potentially disabling 
competition, and state government loses substantial revenue 
essential for the maintenance of vital public services. 
Policymakers can now choose how best to address 
this problem. While any reform measures would obviously 
have to be examined for their impact on public policy and 
practices, we believe the following merit policymakers’ 
consideration: 
● Clarify Guidelines So That  
State Agencies’ Determinations  
Are Uniform and Consistently Applied
Pursuant to Executive Order #78.1, the Governor’s 
Task Force on Independent Contractors [1999] examined 
then current, and to date unchanged, standards and 
procedures among various state agencies and the courts 
for making proper classifications.29 Although the NYS 
Department of Labor provides general classification 
guidelines, in print and on their website, which apply 
to most industries in New York State, the Task Force 
concluded in its Final Report that: 
First, there is no uniform guideline, rule or 
regulation that sets out the criteria to be used 
in determining an employment or independent 
contractor relationship. Second, there is often no 
effort among State regulators to reach consistent 
determinations. Third, State agencies do not 
recognize each other’s determinations.30 
● Presume Employee Status
Recently enacted legislation in Massachusetts [2004] 
seeks to clarify and streamline the determination process 
IV. Items for Policymakers’ Consideration
by presuming employee status so that independent 
contractor classification is recognized only if all three 
elements of a three-part test are met: 
(1) the individual is free from control and direction in 
connection with the performance of the service, both 
under his contract for the performance of service and 
in fact; 
(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of 
the business of the employer; and,
(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession 
or business of the same nature as that involved in the 
service performed.31
 Similarly, New Mexico presumes an employee/
employer relationship for all workers in the construction 
industry. 32
● Extend Employee Protections  
to Independent Contractors
Some observers have noted that one approach to 
mitigating the misclassification problem is to extend 
protections now afforded employees to independent 
contractors. Recognizing that workforce changes that 
have left many workers, both properly classified and 
misclassified independent contractors, beyond the 
protections and benefits of more traditional employer-
employee relations, the Planmatics report for the US DOL 
recommends a “multi-agency dialogue” to study these 
questions:
 Should ICs [independent contractors] participate 
in unemployment insurance, including payment of 
contributions? 
29  The Task Force’s charge was to: (1) identify and recommend guidelines to provide clarity concerning the proper classification of workers; (2) 
propose recommendations to achieve uniform determinations of independent contractor or employee status among the various State agencies; 
(3) ensure that any recommendations are designed to continue the protections afforded to legitimate employees; (4) receive and evaluate in-
formation from labor unions, business groups and all other interested parties. At 1.
30  Task Force Report, at 7.
31  M.G.L. Chapter 149, Section 148b [http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/149-148b.htm.].
32  http://legis.state.nm.us/sessions/05%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0657CTS.pdf.
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 Should workers’ compensation be mandatory for 
them? 
 Should IC agreements be subject to requirements such 
as the payment of a minimum wage?33
If state labor laws were extended to all workers, 
whether employees or independent contractors, the 
classification of these workers would no longer be an 
issue. We note that Colorado requires that workers’ 
compensation coverage be extended to all construction 
workers.34
● Provide More Resources for Enforcement, Promote 
More Information-Sharing Among Agencies
State agencies need the tools to motivate employers 
or compel compliance with classification guidelines. As 
noted in the Planmatics report, “State and federal agencies 
have insufficient staff to crack down on employers who 
misclassify workers.”35 
Currently the New York State Department of Labor 
(DOL) Unemployment Insurance Division identifies cases 
of misclassification in several ways, among which are:
 Unemployment insurance (UI) benefit applications 
 — i.e., when DOL finds that an applicant’s previous 
employer classified him/her as an independent 
contractor, they investigate on behalf of that worker 
as well as others similarly employed by that entity.
 Audits, both general and specific
 Tips from the public
 Data sharing with the Internal Revenue Service
 Employer inquiries
Employers in violation who refuse to cooperate with 
DOL investigators are subject to failure-to-file penalties, 
the assessment of fraud penalties, higher tax assessments 
and tax rates, and periodic audits. The normal procedure 
in regard to audits is to educate employers on proper 
compliance and to bring those employers into compliance. 
Similarly, when employers contact DOL with questions 
about worker classification, they are met with information 
designed to educate and achieve compliance.
Non-compliant employers are subject to the collection 
of back UI taxes plus interest. Follow-up audits on three-
year cycles are conducted on certain violators. 
Issuing stiff penalties for violating classification rules 
would likely encourage greater attention to those rules 
by employers. Under Massachusetts law, for example, 
employers that violate classification rules are subject to 
both criminal and civil penalties involving fines of up to 
$50,000, imprisonment of up to two years, and debarment 
up to five years.36 Well-publicized convictions of willful 
violators could go a long way toward motivating other 
employers to properly classify workers in their firms, 
particularly if enforcement mechanisms were stepped up 
as outlined below.
Permitting aggrieved workers private rights of action 
would further motivate compliance. The Massachusetts 
law cited above allows workers to file a civil action 
seeking treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Illinois’ day 
labor law provides for private right of action and “any 
party” may seek penalties.37
Enhancement of the data collection and audit capa-
bilities of state agencies and requiring a collaborative ap-
proach to misclassification identification and enforcement 
would likely make a dramatic difference. For example, 
33 Planmatics, at 95. See also “Lone Rangers: Are those in the free-agent economy just getting to the future ahead of everyone else?”  
Common Wealth, Winter 2005, available on line at www.hidden-tech.net/articles/CommonWealth-Summer-2005.htm. 
34 htttp://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2004A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/7F2516C7B4E9B70087256D790073B01D?Open&file=1090_enr.pdf].
35 Planmatics at 43.
36 http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/149-148b.htm.
37 820 ILCS 175/95.
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see California’s provision to create an Enforcement Strike 
Force on the Underground Economy.38 Similarly, the (NYS) 
Governor’s Task Force Report on Independent Contractors 
encourages cross-agency participation on a Certification 
Board that would certify the nature of employment re-
lationships for businesses and workers, and their ruling 
would be binding upon all State agencies.
● Conduct High Profile Enforcement
High visibility enforcement directed against targeted 
employers who intentionally misclassify workers, par-
ticularly in industries — such as construction — where the 
practice is widespread, will send a powerful message to 
those who now abuse the system or are tempted to do so. 
● Extend Current Outreach and Education Efforts
To increase compliance, provide all workers and 
employers with information about how “employees” 
and “independent contractors” are distinguishable (e.g., 
workplace posters similar to minimum wage postings). 
While this information is available at the NYS DOL 
website, misclassified workers may not question their 
status until after a situation (layoff, on-the-job illness or 
injury, etc.) has occurred.
Include a 1-800 number and/or a website address on 
required workplace posters for those with questions or 
complaints. (This action was similarly recommended to 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions in GAO Report 06-656, July 2006.)
Ensure that workers feel able to report classification 
errors/abuses by affording them whistleblower-type 
protection. For example, the National Employment Law 
Project (NELP) references the San Francisco Minimum 
Wage Ordinance, which presumes that any adverse action 
taken against a complaining worker is retaliatory if it 
occurs within 90 days of a worker’s complaint.
Information-sharing currently occurs between the 
NYS DOL and the Internal Revenue Service. However, 
every state agency should consistently alert other affected 
agencies, both state and federal, when misclassification is 
identified. (This action was also suggested in GAO Report 
06-656, July 2006.) The point of such notification would 
not be disciplinary (although violators would be subject to 
appropriate penalties) but to ensure compliance at every 
level so that workers, employers, government agencies and 
taxpayers receive their due.
38 See CA UI Code section 329, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cacodes/uic/301-335.html.
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● Defining the Data
The data for our studies come from audits provided by 
the New York State Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Insurance Division.39 The NYS DOL runs two types of 
audits on employers statewide: general and specific.  
General audits are conducted on employers who are not 
suspected violators of state laws. It is important to note 
that these audits are not statistically random; that is, the 
DOL uses a complex method to determine which industries 
should be more heavily scrutinized in general. Industries 
are selected, among other reasons, on a cyclical basis: it 
is not the case that all employers are drawn arbitrarily 
in the “general” sample. For this reason, all statewide 
extrapolations have been performed using data for only 
audited industries.40 However, it is significant that each of the 
employers has no reason to be a likely violator and should 
thus not be considered a specifically targeted entity.
On the other hand, the “specific” group consists of 
employers who, for one reason or another, are suspected 
to be violators of state laws. They are targeted based on 
multiple factors, including prior violations and other 
variables that increase their likelihood of noncompliance.  
They are not drawn at random in any way; their inclusion 
in the audit group is subjective.
The data give both general and specific employer 
information over a four-year period, from 2002 to 2005.  
This period was chosen because it gives the most recent 
data available and because it can be used to show 
current trends in the data. Rather than simply including 
a snapshot of worker misclassification, we are analyzing 
patterns, both in the types of audits performed and in the 
scope of noncompliance.
In our analysis, we look at the general and specific 
data separately to show individual trends. Additionally, we 
combine the two groups into a third category, which we 
call all audits. These aggregate data give a broader picture, 
which can be used to approximate what is happening 
across all those industries included in NYS DOL audits.
● What the Data Show
A U D I T  C O U N T S
Table A provides audit counts for the audited 
industries. The table shows an upward trend in both 
the numbers of general selection audits and the total 
number of audits, though the rate of increase is declining. 
According to NYS DOL, this is due to limited staff and 
resources. Specific audits appear to remain relatively 
unchanged for the first two years of analysis but shoot 
upward in 2004 and almost double in 2005; this reflects a 
shift in NYS DOL’s focus.
Clearly, across the audited industries, the number 
of specific audits is increasing quickly. In all, there were 
38,280 audits performed over the four-year period. The 
vast majority of those were general selection.
Table A: Audit Counts (Audited Industries)
V. Methodology
39  In the audit data, some firms are identified to have “alleged independent contractors,” which can be considered misclassified employees. 
However, these workers may not necessarily all be misclassified. It has been generally acceptable to use a form of “independent contractor” 
allegations to measure misclassification.
40 Industries covered by DOL audits for the years 2002-2005 include: construction; manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; transportation 
and warehousing; information; finance and insurance; real estate; professional, scientific, and technical services; administrative and support 
and waste management and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation; other industries.
 Year General  Specific  All  
  Audits Audits Audits
 2002 7,057 203 7,260
 2003 9,202 197 9,399
 2004 10,102 476 10,578
 2005 10,109 934 11,043
 Total 36,470 1,810 38,280
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Table B gives the audit counts for only the construction 
industry. In direct contrast to the counts in audited 
industries, the general audits and total numbers of audits 
have plummeted in the past four years. Specific audits 
have been on the rise, especially in 2005, where there 
were almost three times as many specific firms as in the 
year prior. Thus, the driving force behind the large drop in 
construction audits comes from the general selected firms, 
specifically between 2003 and 2004. Between these two 
years, general construction audits fell from 2,053 to 520, 
a drop of 74.7 percent. Between 2004 and 2005, general 
audits dropped another 27.5 percent, to 377. In all, over the 
period studied, general construction audits fell from 2,309 
to 377, a four-year decrease of 83.7 percent.
Table B: Audit Counts (Construction Industry)
Of further interest, when one compares the trends 
in these data to those in Table A, the results are even 
more marked.  Overall, the number of general audits 
has increased over the four years, yet, as Table C shows, 
the construction industry’s share of the total number of 
audits has fallen at a rapid rate over the past four years. 
The intense decline of construction’s share of general 
audits is slightly buoyed by a larger portion of specific 
audits dedicated to construction firms. While there has 
been a 29 percent decrease in construction’s share of all 
general audits, construction’s share of specific audits has 
increased 8.3 percent over the period analyzed. However, 
when all audits are grouped, construction has lost 26.9 
percent of its share in audit counts, having comprised 32.2 
percent in 2002. As noted above, DOL suggests this is due 
to adjustments in the selection criteria used by the DOL 
in order to identify the greatest number of firms out of 
compliance.
Table C:  
Construction as a Percent of Audited Industries
 Year General  Specific  All  
  Audits Audits Audits
 2002 2,309 28 2,337
 2003 2,053 34 2,087
 2004 520 79 599
 2005 377 206 583
 Total 5,259 347 5,606
This change is explained by the New York State 
Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division, 
as due to adjustments in the general selection criteria to 
provide the best return on investment; that general audits 
conducted in industries other than construction were 
yielding considerably greater evidence of non-compliance 
as measured in additional taxable wages and/or taxes. 
Looking at data over a longer period of time might of-
fer additional insight into what is occurring among con-
struction firms; however, the massive decrease in audit 
counts is extremely significant in terms of analysis of non-
compliance in the construction industry. The sample of 
firms audited has become quite small; if these downward 
trends continue, it will be hard to gather information 
about noncompliance trends.
 Year General  Specific  All  
  Audits Audits Audits
 2002 32.7% 13.8% 32.2%
 2003 22.3% 17.3% 22.2%
 2004 5.2% 16.6% 5.7%
 2005 3.7% 22.1% 5.3%
 Average 14.4% 19.2% 14.6%
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